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International economic institutions, particularly the G20, the OECD and the IMF, 
have been vocal in advocating reform of fossil fuel subsidies. The question that the 
paper seeks to answer is how influential the institutions have been in inducing 
countries to reform their fossil fuel subsidies? Although studies of individual fossil 
fuel subsidy reforms point to the role of international economic institutions as one 
factor among many, no overarching study has studied their influence across 
countries. This gap deserves to be addressed, particularly given the power of these 
institutions. 
More specifically, the paper focuses on pathways of influence which go beyond 
legally binding multilateral agreements. Such influences include learning, ideational 
change such as socialisation, and commitments which have to be adhered to. 
Concerning fossil subsidy reform, these pathways may consist of adherence to the 
(non-binding) G20 commitment, learning about fossil fuel subsidies and the 
possibilities to reform them, or socialisation into the norm that such subsidies should 
be reformed. Case studies of the US, India, the UK, Indonesia, Sweden and Denmark 
showed that ideational change stemming from the G20 and the OECD helped move 
fossil fuel subsidies up the agenda in industrialised countries, IMF was decisive in 
one case of Indonesian fossil fuel reform, and that learning processes mattered in 
terms of workshops organised by the OECD and the World Bank. 
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Introduction  
The last decade, fossil fuel subsidy reform has been rising on the agenda of 
international economic institutions such as the Group of Twenty (G20), the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Importantly, international environmental 
institutions such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
have been rather silent on the issue except for the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC 1997), 
whose provisions on fossil fuel subsidy reform did not lead to concrete measures. 
Simultaneously have such subsidies also been the subject of increasing debate in 
several countries, often leading – particularly in developing countries – to successful 
reform of these subsidies. The question arises whether this correlation indicates a 
causal influence from the international economic institutions to domestic policies. 
 
A growing body of literature is seeking to identify the role of different political, 
economic and social factors in explaining fossil fuel subsidies and their reform 
(Victor 2009; Cheon et al. 2013; Lockwood 2015). Although studies of individual 
fossil fuel subsidy reforms point to the role of international economic institutions as 
one factor among many in individual cases of such reforms (see inter alia Beaton and 
Lonton 2010; Lockwood 2015), no overarching study exists which focus on the 
influence of these institutions across countries. This gap deserves to be addressed, 
particularly as these institutions have generally been described as having a very 
significant impact on government policy (see Vreeland 2007). Furthermore, an 
important aspect of the impact of these institutions is how or more precisely through 
which causal mechanisms they may have influenced domestic policy. Whether the 
institutions have influenced domestic policy via socialisation into norms, learning or 
more coercive/compliance-based mechanisms of influence (Holzinger and Knill 2005; 
Dobbin et al. 2007; Marsh and Sharman 2009) is both academically and politically 
relevant. 
 
In order to address these issues and gaps, the paper will answer the following research 
question: 
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Research question: To which degree and through which causal mechanisms did 
international economic institutions influence fossil fuel subsidy reform in specific 
countries?  
 
The question concerns the actual impact of the G20, the IMF, the World Bank and the 
OECD on national policies defined as fossil fuel subsidies in India, Indonesia, 
Denmark, Sweden, the UK and the US. The paper focuses on the causal mechanisms 
of influence rather on which institution they emerged from, since the mechanisms are 
more theoretically and politically relevant, and the institutions arguably constituted 
elements of an institutional complex (Biermann et al. 2009; Keohane and Victor 
2011) with closely interrelated roles regarding fossil fuel subsidy reform.  
 
Importantly, fossil fuel subsidy reform can be framed in economic as well as 
environmental terms. The paper explicitly focuses on the relationship between 
environmental and economic framings of fossil fuel subsidies, and on how 
international economic institutions have addressed the issue. This focus is due to 
economic institutions are likely to be decisive for fossil fuel subsidy reform. The 
countries studied cover countries at different levels of economic development, G20 
members as well as non-G20 members, and countries with varying degree of success 
in reforming fossil fuel subsidies.  
 
The paper proceeds with outlining the theoretical framework for studying 
international influences on domestic policy. The subsequent section outlines how this 
theoretical framework has been operationalised, and this section is followed by the 
application of the framework to the six country cases. 
 
 
Theoretical framework  
If different countries adopt similar policies within the same period of time, it may be 
“the result of similar but independent responses of political actors to parallel problem 
pressures” (Holzinger & Knill 2005: 786), or it may be the result of the same factor 
influencing them. In the case of fossil fuel subsidy reform, fiscal crises fall into the 
former category of parallel factors, while influence from international economic 
institutions – the topic of this paper – falls into the latter category. Following Robert 
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Keohane (Keohane 1989: 3-4), international institutions shall be understood as a 
”persistent & connected sets of rules (formal & informal) that prescribe behavior, 
constrain activities and shape expectations”. According to this definition, international 
organizations constitute one subset of international institutions. 
Within the International Relations literature on influences from the international to the 
domestic level, constructivists have focused on the dissemination of ideas – including 
norms of appropriate behaviour – from the international to the domestic level, while 
rationalist scholars have focused more on the impact of conditionalities imposed by 
international organizations such as the IMF (Vreeland 2007) or the EU 
(Schimmelfennig 2008). Further, neo-Gramscian scholars have focused on the spread 
of hegemonic ideas from the international to the domestic level as part of a neoliberal 
world order (Cox 1981; Gill 1995).  
Most of the literature on international influences focuses on one kind of influence 
(Dobbin et al. 2007), but increasingly scholars have developed more comprehensive 
frameworks for comparing different kinds of influences (Bernstein and Cashore 
2012). While the frameworks may focus on different but closely related concepts such 
as policy diffusion, policy transfer or policy convergence, they generally distinguish 
between normative/socialisation-based, market-based/competitive, learning/lesson-
drawing and coercive/compliance-based mechanisms of influence (Holzinger and 
Knill 2005; Dobbin et al. 2007; Marsh and Sharman 2009).  
The present paper will draw on these frameworks in order to to identify three kinds of 
casual mechanisms of influence from the international economic institutions: 
ideational, learning and power-based.1 Importantly, in order to study these influences 
it is necessary to focus on their impact on the policy processes and policy debates 
(Kingdon 2003; Sabatier and Weible 2014) that related to fossil fuel subsidy reform. 
Hence the object of the institutions’ influence is not the state as a whole, but rather 
different actors and/or the setting in which actors operate. 
First, normative or ideational influences concern both the room of manoeuvre for 
actors to influence decision-making, but also, and more fundamentally, affects how 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Competition, often mentioned as a fourth mechanism, is less relevant to the case of fossil 
fuel subsidy reform. 
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actors perceive the world and their own goals. The latter kind of ideational influence 
involves actors internalising specific beliefs and goals and taking them for granted, 
rather than perceiving them as external constraints (Checkel 2005: 804). For instance, 
domestic actors could internalise the belief that a given kind of policy (e.g. a tax 
break) constitutes a fossil fuel subsidy and that reforming fossil fuel subsidies 
constitutes a desirable goal. Besides changing the beliefs and goals of actors, 
ideational influence also implies that some actors will be empowered, whereas others 
will be weakened. The reason is that the introduction of new norms or changes to 
existing norms may legitimize (or delegitimize) particular goals or actors as well as 
open up new avenues for framing issues (e.g. framing a particular policy as a fossil 
fuel subsidy). Ideational influence originating from the international institutions can 
be the result of officials interacting with peers within the institutions (Johnston 2001) 
– e.g. in the context of the OECD, or IOs actively promoting particular normative 
ideas such as the desirability of fossil fuel reform. International institutions can be 
particularly influential once a given nom has reached an international “tipping point” 
at which norm adherence is driven by international to a larger degree than domestic 
factors (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 902). 
Second, learning is understood as changing beliefs concerning the “best” (generally 
most efficient or effective) way to achieve an objective on the basis of past 
experiences. Unlike normative change, learning does not involve changes to actors’ 
goals or to the normative structures of society defining what is appropriate. The 
experiences may have happened to the individual who is learning, or she/he may draw 
on the experiences of others (Dobbin et al. 2007: 460), for instance may policy-
makers contemplating fossil fuel subsidy reform learn from successful and 
unsuccessful reforms in other countries. Learning can be generated from experiences 
in other countries but is often disseminated via international institutions, either in 
groups of officials (Haas 2000)(Haas 2000) or through the active dissemination of 
best practices by the IOs (see inter alia Lehtonen 2007: regarding the OECD; 
Seabrooke 2011: regarding the IMF).  
Third, power or coercion-based influences. International institutions may influence 
domestic policy by placing individual (often legal) commitments on states, by 
imposing direct conditionalities on the states (e.g. IMF or World Bank programs), or 
by providing support (e.g. finance) for particular policies. Such influences 
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certain actions while empowering or disempowering particular constituencies (Kahler 
2000). The power-based influence of international economic institutions is well-
documented, particularly the influence of IMF and World Bank Structural Adjustment 
Programs (Vreeland 2007), which are relevant to fossil fuel subsidy reform since they 
intervene directly in domestic policy in order to improve fiscal balances.  
Importantly, the influence of an institution primarily takes place via what will be 
referred to as the “governmental constituency” of the institution, viz. the member 
states’ representatives which on a regular basis represent their state in the interaction 
with the institutions. The governmental constituencies of international economic 
institutions typically come from finance ministries. Which ministries and other 
domestic actors also matter in relation to the question of whether fossil fuel subsidies 
are framed as an environmental or an economic (in most cases fiscal) issue (on 
framing, see Schön and Rein 1994). Framing it as an environmental issue involves 
environmental actors such as environmental NGOs and environment ministries, 
whereas framing it as an economic issue involves economic actors such as finance 
ministries and economic think tanks. Given that the most important (direct) economic 
consequences of fossil fuel subsidies are fiscal, an economic framing of fossil fuel is 
unlikely to mobilise actors beyond government in favour of reform, since few interest 
groups will benefit directly from such reform but many will lose from it (see also 




The countries studied are Denmark, India, Indonesia, Sweden, the UK and the US. 
These countries have been selected as they cover both industrialised and emerging 
economies, and G20 members as well as non-G20 members. Furthermore, during the 
last fifteen years the six countries vary in terms of experiences with fossil fuel subsidy 
reform: while the UK and to some degree also Sweden Denmark do not acknowledge 
having fossil fuel subsidies, the other countries acknowledges this, but the degree to 
which the reform was successful reform range from very limited (the US,) over mixed 
(Indonesia in the mid-2000s) to high (India, Indonesia in recent years). Finally, all six 
of them have played important roles in international discussions of fossil fuel subsidy 
reform. 
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The analysis relies on a combination of official documents, key informant interviews 
and second-hand sources. The official documents originate from the governments in 
question. The key informants (a total of 15) are primarily senior officials currently or 
previously responsible for fossil fuel subsidies, and coming from finance ministries 
and other key ministries or agencies (mainly relating to energy) from the countries 
studied.  Interviews and secondary sources have been used to assess the different 
kinds of influence from IEIs. The analysis also identifies any major changes to 
policies defined as fossil fuel subsidies in the countries studied (reductions as well as 
increases), in order to determine which factors (including but not limited to 
international economic institutions) played a role. Thus, the focus is on policies rather 
than on price levels as such, since the focus of the paper is on influence on policy 




Empirical context: IEIs addressing FFSR  
Although the efforts of international economic institutions to address fossil fuel 
subsidies go back decades, they were lifted to a different level by the 2009 G20 
commitment to “phase out and rationalize over the medium term inefficient fossil fuel 
subsidies while providing targeted support for the poorest” (G20 Heads of State and 
Government 2009). The commitment resulted inter alia in a process in which the 
member states report their fossil fuel subsidy reform strategies and timetables, which 
may then be subject to voluntary peer reviews by other G20 members and 
representatives of international organizations such as the OECD. It is up to the 
member states to identify which fossil fuel subsidies exist in their own country and 
how to phase them out. The G20 member states have used different definitions of 
fossil subsidies. Seven countries (Australia, Brazil, France, Japan, Saudi Arabia, 
South Africa and the United Kingdom) have claimed to have no inefficient fossil fuel 
subsidies2, whereas other countries have submitted plans for phasing out their 
subsidies with varying degrees ambition (Kirton et al. 2013: 62-69).  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Claims that contradict the findings of independent think tanks such as the Global Subsidies Initiative. 
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Crucial for the discussion of which countries that have fossil fuel subsidies is which 
definition of fossil fuel subsidies that is used and to which one focuses on 
consumption and/or production subsidies (van Asselt and Skovgaard, forthcoming). 
Regarding definitions there is an important distinction between the conferred benefits-
approach and the price-gap approach (Koplow 2009; OECD Secretariat 2010). The 
former approach focuses on whether policies confer a benefit to specific groups (e.g., 
the latter focuses on whether whether prices are below a benchmark price (Koplow 
2009). The benchmark price is generally based on the international price of a given 
fossil fuel, sometimes also including transport, distribution, value added tax and/or a 
tax corresponding to the externalities stemming from the fuel (Gerasimchuk 2014). 
The second distinction separates producer subsidies (directed at extraction of fossil 
fuels) from consumer subsidies (directed at the use of fossil fuels). Consumer 
subsidies are concentrated in the developing countries while producer subsidies are 
more common in the industrialized countries. 
 
The OECD addressed fossil fuel subsidies before the G20 commitment as part of the 
regular environmental performance reviews of individual member states, studies of 
pricing policies and more general studies. Generally, the OECD’s activities have 
focused on creating knowledge about fossil fuel subsidies and promoting the norm 
that fossil fuel subsidies should be reformed. Using a conferred-benefits approach to 
identifying fossil fuel subsidies, the OECD Secretariat found fossil fuel “support”3 
measures in all 34 OECD countries, (OECD Secretariat 2005; OECD Secretariat 
2010; IEA et al. 2011; OECD Secretariat 2011). Furthermore, the OECD Secretariat 
has arranged workshops on fossil fuel subsides for representative of member states. 
Yet, it was only following the G20 commitment that the member states gave the 
OECD Secretariat the mandate to scrutinise their national fossil fuel subsidies 
(interview with OECD officials, April 29th 2015). 
 
The IMF and the World Bank have both followed a two–pronged approach focusing 
both on inducing states subject to IMF or World Bank programs to reform their 
subsidies and on providing knowledge about and promoting fossil fuel subsidy reform 
as a norm. The former strand dates back decades, as the two Bretton Woods 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  The	  OECD	  uses	  the	  term	  support	  rather	  than	  subsidies.	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institutions have sought to phase out any kind of subsidy irrespective of its 
environmental consequences. The latter strand took off after the G20 commitment, 
especially since the G20 commissioned the World Bank (as well as the OECD, the 
IEA and OPEC) with analysing the scope of fossil fuel subsidies. Importantly, in 2013 
and 2015 the IMF published reports using a price-gap which included environmental 
externalities in the benchmark; an approach which led to estimates of global fossil 
fuel subsidies of respectively US$ 1900 and 5300 billion (Clements et al. 2013; 
Coady et al. 2015). These reports constituted a radical break with previous estimates 
from inter alia the IEA (2014), which had estimated global subsidies at US$ 550 
billion based on benchmark prices without such externalities. The IMF approach led 
to the conclusion that industrialised countries account for a quarter of all fossil fuel 
subsidies.   
 
While the concept of fossil fuel subsidies and their reform have risen significantly on 
the agenda of the international economic institutions, it is not given that this rise in 
prominence has translated into actual changes on the national level, including changes 
in policy. How the six states have reacted to the economic institutions’ call for fossil 
fuel subsidy reform and whether this call has influenced national policy is the subject 
to which this paper now turns. 
 
 
The Influence of International Economic Institutions on Fossil Fuel Subsidies  
 
The US  
Most US fossil fuel subsidies are federal tax reductions and directed at producers of 
oil, gas and coal, and can be measured in billions of US$ (Makhijani 2014). The US 
federal government have long acknowledged the existence of US fossil fuel subsidies, 
and the Obama administration has proposed phasing out federal fossil fuel subsidies 
in its budget proposals. Yet, these reforms have not passed Congress due to 
opposition from groups tied to the recipients of the subsidies. 
   
Internationally, the US has actively promoted fossil fuel subsidy reform. As the host 
of the September 2009 G20 summit, the US played a crucial role as policy 
entrepreneur in getting the fossil fuel subsidy reform commitment adopted. This 
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active role is at least partly due to the desire within the Obama administration to phase 
out subsidies (tax breaks) to fossil fuel producers within the US (interview with 
former senior US Treasury official, April 8th 2014). Within the Obama administration, 
it is mainly the White House and the Treasury which address fossil fuel subsidies both 
domestically and internationally. The Treasury is the most involved department on a 
day-to-day basis and saw fossil fuel subsidies equally in terms of its fiscal, macro-
economic, and environmental consequences (interview with former senior US 
Treasury official, May 6th 2014).  
 
Generally speaking, the influence of international economic institutions were limited 
by the fact that the US federal government already acknowledged the existence of 
fossil fuel subsidies and sought to reform but did not succeed due to domestic 
barriers. The G20 commitment amttereed mire to US politics than the OECD defining 
specific policies as subsidies (since these policies were already widely recognised as 
subsidies in the US). In its progress report to the G20 the US acknowledged that the 
tax reductions constitute fossil fuel subsidies as well as the existence of one 
consumption subsidy directed at low-income households (US Treasury 2014). In 
terms of ideational influence, the G20 commitment created an international 
commitment and norm the Obama administration could use to promote its 
(unsuccessful) reform proposals. Furthermore, there was close collaboration between 
Treasury officials and the IMF officials who had drafted the IMF definition on fossil 
fuel subsidies and other issues, but this collaboration did not amount to an ideational 
influence that induced the Treasury to adopt a price-gap approach including 
environmental externalities the way the IMF’s definition of fossil fuel subsidies does 
(Clements et al 2013).  
 
Learning processes and power-based influences (since US federal government wanted 
to reform fossil fuel subsidies already before the G20 commitment) were not relevant 
to the US case.  
 
The UK  
Fossil fuel subsidies in the UK are mainly constituted by reduced rates of VAT for 
fuel and power and covering of liabilities related to coal mining. The UK government 
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has generally been very supportive of addressing the issue at the international level, 
including within the G20 (interview with UK Treasury Official, 24 November 2014). 
 
Internationally (in the reports to the G20) as well as domestically, the UK government 
has argued that the UK does no have any inefficient fossil fuel subsidies. This 
argument is based on the definition of fossil fuel subsidies as as “any Government 
measure or programme with the objective or direct consequence of reducing, below 
world-market prices, including all costs of transport, refining and distribution, the 
effective cost of fossil fuels paid by final consumers, or of reducing the costs or 
increasing the revenues of fossil-fuel producing companies”. The definition 
corresponds to the UK government’s general framing of fossil fuel subsidies as 
something which exists in developing countries.  
Interestingly, the ideational influence from G20 commitment changed the context for 
action when the UK government’s definition of fossil fuel subsidies and its claim that 
the UK does not have fossil fuel subsidies was challenged by the House of Commons’ 
Environmental Audit Committee (2013) in its report on energy subsidies. The 
Committee (which has members from all major parties) commissioned a report which 
used price-gap approach which included VAT in the benchmark price, which meant 
that lower VAT rates on inter alia the electricity consumption of households and small 
business were defined as subsidies, which alone corresponded to a subsidy of 3.6 
billion GBP to gas. The crucial difference is that the UK government does not include 
VAT in its benchmark price, while the Committee includes it. Thus, the G20 
commitment brought fossil fuel subsidies on the agenda and opened up new venues 
for actors opposed to fossil fuel subsidies within the UK (many of whom testified to 
the Committee), but did not lead to any domestic policy changes.  
In terms of socialisation, UK officials from the Treasury and other ministries 
interacted on a regular basis with the different IOs addressing fossil fuel subsidies. 
The Treasury perceived fossil fuel subsidies in terms similar to the way in which the 
economic IOs did, namely as undesirable firstly due to their economic distortionary 
effects and secondly due to their environmental effects (interview with UK Treasury 
official, 24/11/2014). This interaction did not lead to significant changes of the beliefs 
and goals regarding British fossil fuel subsidies within the Treasury. The Treasury 
	   12	  
interacted most closely with the IEA, whose definition (a price-gap approach not 
including environmental externalities) resonated with the UK government’s definition 
(ibid.). Altogether, learning, ideational change in terms of changing the beliefs and 




The vast majority of the Indian subsidies are constituted by compensating oil 
marketing companies for losses incurred when selling diesel, kerosene and Liquid 
Petroleum Gas (LPG) at a loss, so-called under-recovery. The sizeable Indian fossil 
fuel subsidies increased drastically through the 2000s to a peak at above US$ 16 
billion (1.75 per cent of GDP) in the fiscal year 2012-2013  (IISD 2014). From 2013, 
the Indian government embarked on a series of fossil fuel subsidy reforms, starting 
with reforming diesel prices followed by reform of LPG prices. 
 
The Indian government has been sceptical of attempts to address fossil fuel subsidy 
reform on the international level, including within the G20. Particularly the attempts 
to frame it as an environmental issue has been criticized, as the Indian government 
preferred to frame it as an economic and fiscal issue (see Dasgupta 2013 for an 
example of such a view). This position shall be seen in the light of the historically 
predominant (yet increasingly challenged) view within the Indian elite that climate 
change is the responsibility of the industrialized countries and that developing 
countries should not commit themselves to climate change actions (Thaker & 
Leiserowitz 2014; Malik 2013).  
 
However, the Indian government is undertaking a program of fossil fuel subsidy 
reform which is phasing out several fossil fuel subsidies (of diesel, kerosene and 
Liquid Petroleum Gas), and has reported on the progress of these reforms to the G20. 
The Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas have been the 
ministries responsible for the reforms. Neither the G20 commitments nor other 
influences from the international economic institutions played a significant role. 
According to all of the former and current officials from the two ministries 
interviewed, the main reasons for undertaking these reforms have been their fiscal and 
macro-economic: there are less costly ways of alleviating poverty, and the fossil fuel 
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subsidies were bad for the public budget and the balance of trade (as they increased 
oil imports). Two contextual factors made the reform possible: first and most 
importantly the low oil prices which provided a window of opportunity for 
liberalizing fuel prices without provoking public protests, and secondly the ongoing 
liberalisation of the Indian economy since the early 1990s.  
 
Although the liberalisation of the Indian economy arguably can be seen as the result 
of socialisation into particular norms advocating free-market economic governance 
(Mukherji 2013), more specific ideational influences concerning fossil fuel subsidies 
have not been possibly to identify. Power-based influences were also absent. 
However, regarding learning, participating in workshops arranged by the World Bank 
provided opportunities for learning from other emerging economies which had gone 
through similar fossil fuel reforms (interview with senior Indian Ministry of Finance 




In Indonesia, fossil fuel subsidies have amounted to 4.5 per cent of GDP or above 20 
per cent of public expenditure (Dartanto 2016). Consumer subsidies in the shape of 
fixing prices of oil products below the market price have constituted the majority of 
these subsidies. Since 2000, the Indonesian government has attempted various fossil 
fuel subsidy reforms, some of which have been successful, others less so (Yusuf 
2016). Recent reforms from 2014 and onwards have succeeded in phasing out 
subsidies to petrol while retaining diesel subsidies at reduced levels (IISD 2015).  
 
The various Indonesian government has acknowledged the existence of fossil fuel 
subsidies, and the current Widodo government has explicitly aimed at phasing out 
most fossil fuel subsidies and using the finances saved for pro-poor policies. Within 
the context of G20, Indonesia has continuously reported its plans and efforts to reform 
fossil fuel subsidies. However, the G20 commitment has not had an impact on 
Indonesian fossil fuel subsidy reforms, which have been driven by domestic factors 
rather than international ones. Nonetheless, power-based influences have played a 
role in terms of the IMF program following the 1997/98 Asian crisis, and which in the 
course of 2002 led to continuous increases in the fixed fuel prices until they reached 
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levels close to or at international prices (Yusuf 2016: 5-6). Yet, international oil prices 
were low in 2002, and when they increased the following years, domestic prices did 
not follow, thus increasing the expenditure on subsidies. Subsequent reforms have 
been more driven by the Indonesian Ministry of Finance, which worried about the 
impact on the budget and public debt (interview with Indonesian Ministry of Finance 
official, 26 February 2016). Until recently, it was only when fossil fuel subsidies 
made the fiscal situation untenable it was politically possible to reform fossil fuel 
subsidies. However, the current President Joko Widodoto have undertaken subsidy 
reform in order to re-allocate the funds saved to development or poverty-reduction 
policies. 
 
Other kinds of influence from international economic institutions (learning; 
socialisation) appear to have been relatively unimportant, since the Indonesian started 
addressing fossil fuel subsidies before it became an important issue on the 
international agenda, and its reforms have not been shaped by concrete efforts by the 
international economic institutions.  
 
Sweden  
Swedish policies subsidising fossil fuels mainly consist of reduced CO2 and energy 
tax rates for uses such as energy production or diesel used in agriculture and forestry. 
Some of these subsidies have been reduced or phased out, most notably the reduced 
CO2 tax rates for industrial producers outside the EU Emissions Trading System 
which has been reduced since 2009. 
 
While the Swedish government has actively promoted fossil fuel subsidy reform 
internationally, especially within the Friends of Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform group, it 
has not been interested in linking these international efforts to Swedish fossil fuel 
subsidies. The changes to Swedish fossil fuel subsidies have been driven by domestic 
concerns rather than direct influences from the international economic institutions. 
However, the OECD has estimated the scope of fossil fuel support in Sweden and 
defined the tax exemptions and reductions and support in the context of its inventories 
of fossil fuel support/subsidies. Perhaps more importantly, the OECD’s 2014 
Environmental Performance Review of Sweden criticised these exemptions and 
reductions for being detrimental to a cost-efficient climate policy (OECD 2014), a 
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criticism which was picked up in Swedish media (SVR 2014). In this way, ideational 
influences from the OECD to some degree strengthened critics (from environmental 
NGOs and the Green Party) of the differentiated CO2 and energy taxes by moving the 
issue up the agenda and allowing them to refer to the OECD criticism, yet without 
this influence leading to actual changes in policy. Similar analyses had previously 
been put forward the Swedish National Audit Office (2012) and the Swedish 
Environmental Protection Agency (2012), and the OECD Performance Review added 
to the weight of their arguments but did not provide a radically new perspective on the 
issue. Although Swedish officials have participated actively in meetings concerning 
fossil fuel subsidies hosted by the OECD and other international economic 
institutions, this did not lead to internalisation of the norm that tax expenditure 
constitutes a subsidy, or learning about how to best reform such tax expenditure. 
Power-based influences were not relevant in the Swedish case. 
  
Denmark  
In Denmark – like in Sweden – fossil fuel subsidies are mainly constituted by reduced 
energy taxes and duties for fuels used in specific sectors (e.g. agriculture), as well as 
support for oil extraction. The rates of these tax reductions have remained constant 
the last fifteen years. Similar to the Swedish government, the Danish government 
have actively promoted fossil fuel subsidy reform internationally, particularly within 
Friends of Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform. The Danish government has acknowledged 
that production subsidies constitute fossil fuel subsidies, but argues that this is not the 
case with the tax expenditures since the taxing of fossil fuel use generally speaking 
exceeds the externalities (Danish Parliament 2015). Environmental NGOs have 
increasingly called for phasing out the subsidies, using the Danish government’s 
international efforts for reforming fossil fuel subsidies, particularly within the Friends 
of Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform  (The Ecological Council 2012; 2014; Politiken, 13 
February 2015).  
 
The international economic institutions have played a limited role in these 
discussions, although some NGOs, journalists and politicians have referred to 
respectively the OECD inventory of fossil fuel support and the IMF’s estimate that 
Danish fossil fuel subsidies amount to US$ 1000 per capita (Information, 8 August 
2015; Altinget 14 January 2016; The Ecological Council 2014). It is via this kind of 
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ideational influence on the domestic policy agenda in Denmark that the international 
economic institutions have been most influential. Although participation in 
workshops about fossil fuel subsidies arranged by the OECD increased knowledge 
and awareness of the topic within the Finance Ministry and other ministries (thus 
constituting limited ideational change), this did not translate into concrete government 





The analysis showed that the influence of the international economic institutions 
operated through three different mechanisms, which were influential in different kinds 
of countries. First, in terms of power-based influences an IMF Structural Adjust 
Program was decisive in inducing Indonesia to undertake fossil fuel reform in the 
early 2000s. Second, the G20 commitment and OECD inventories of fossil fuel 
support helped move fossil fuel subsidies up the agenda and strengthened actors 
calling for fossil fuel subsidy reform in countries such as the US, Sweden, Denmark 
and most notably the UK, thus constituting ideational influence. However, these 
influences did not lead to actual policy change, but arguably increased the possibility 
of future change. Ideational change may have helped convincing industrialised 
countries that fossil fuel subsidies were undesirable, but not that their own policies 
constituted such subsidies. Third, learning processes mattered in terms of workshops 
organised by the OECD and the World Bank increasing the understanding of fossil 
fuel subsidies and their reform – including experiences from other countries – among 
government officials. However, only in the case of India was such learning important 
in relation to actual fossil fuel subsidy reform, and played a role in shaping how the 
reforms were carried out rather than causing the reform as such. Altogether, the 
power-based influence of the IMF proved more important than the more ideational 
and learned based influence of the OECD (and in some cases the World Bank), while 
the influence of the G20’s non-binding commitment has been ideational rather than 
power- or learning based.  
 
The major successful fossil fuel reforms have taken place in developing countries, 
with lesser reforms in the US and Sweden. These reforms (especially in the 
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developing countries) were driven by domestic rather than international factors, and 
economic rather than environmental concerns. Even if the initial reform in Indonesia 
was driven by the IMF program, the Indonesian government continued to adopt 
reforms due to domestic factors particularly fiscal problems. Consequently, it appears 
there are limits to how international institutions can do by framing fossil fuel 
subsidies in environmental terms. Even governments actively promoting fossil fuel 
subsidy reform internationally (the UK, Sweden, Denmark) have not been 
successfully entrapped by their international commitments, although attempts have 
been made to use their international efforts to induce fossil fuel subsidy reform. 
Perhaps a more useful path is to emphasise the economic benefits and promote 
learning about how to implement fossil fuel subsidy reform when economic windows 
of opportunity appear. 
 
In terms of future research, it makes sense to adopt a longer term perspective and 
explore the role of international economic institutions not only when fossil fuel 
subsidy reform is introduced, but also in terms of maintaining these reforms. It would 
be particularly relevant when political pressure for reintroducing subsidies is high, 
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